Land & Water Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 1 Special Focus: NEPA at Twenty

Article 14

1990

Civil Procedure - Ropin'em on the Range in the Cowboy State:
Should Assertions of Transient Jurisdiction Be Subject to
Minimum Contracts Analysis - Nutri-West v. Gibson
Dale Floyd Call

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Call, Dale Floyd (1990) "Civil Procedure - Ropin'em on the Range in the Cowboy State: Should Assertions
of Transient Jurisdiction Be Subject to Minimum Contracts Analysis - Nutri-West v. Gibson," Land & Water
Law Review: Vol. 25 : Iss. 1 , pp. 239 - 249.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol25/iss1/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Call: Civil Procedure - Ropin'em on the Range in the Cowboy State: Shou

CASENOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-Ropin'em on the Range in the Cowboy State:
Should Assertions of Transient Jurisdiction be Subject to "Minimum Contacts" Analysis? Nutri-West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693
(Wyo. 1988).
Paul White, manager of a Wyoming business known as Nutri-West,
contacted Betty Gibson in her home state of California, by phone and
in person, to offer her an exclusive in-state distributorship of NutriWest's health care products.' Mr. White eventually convinced Ms. Gibson to accept the offer and thereafter mailed her a distributorship
contract.2
Ms. Gibson, her spouse James Gibson, Robert Davies, and his spouse
Kathleen Davies signed the contract in California and formed a partnership known as Nutri-West of California.' The partnership solicited
sales of Nutri-West products, ordered them by mail or phone from NutriWest's Douglas, Wyoming headquarters, and sold them in California.4
By June of 1987, Nutri-West had become dismayed with the partnership's contractual performance.- Nutri-West filed a complaint in
Wyoming District Court seeking a declaration of the rights of the parties under the agreement and an injunction prohibiting the partnership from acting as distributors.' On June 27, 1987, Ms. Gibson attended
a convention held at Nutri-West headquarters in Douglas, Wyoming.7
At the convention, a deputy sheriff of Converse County, Wyoming,
served Ms. Gibson personally, and as agent for Mr. Gibson, Mr. Davies,
and Ms. Davies, with four copies of the complaint and four summonses.'
The Gibsons and Davies entered a special appearance to quash service
and contest jurisdiction.9 They contended that neither Ms. Gibson, the
other partners, nor the partnership Nutri-West of California had sufficient contacts with Wyoming to permit a Wyoming court to assert jurisdiction constitutionally over them. 10 The district court agreed and dismissed the case."
1. Nutri-West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693, 694 (Wyo. 1988).

2. Id.
3. Id. The contract agreement was entered into on or about February 10, 1985.
Brief of Appellees at 6, Nutri-West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693 (Wyo. 1988) (No. 87-266).
4. Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 694.
5. Id.
6. Brief of Appellees at 1.
7. Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 694.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Brief of Appellees at 2. Appellees contended that they did not reside in Wyoming, that they did no business in Wyoming, that they solicited no sales in Wyoming,
that they owned no real or personal property in Wyoming, and that, except for Ms.
Gibson's temporary presence at the convention, they had never been to Wyoming. Id.
at 25.
11. Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 694. The district court concluded that "the defendants
[did] not have sufficient contacts with this state to allow a Wyoming court to exercise
jurisdiction over them." Id.
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On appeal, Nutri-West argued that the district court erred in applying the "minimum contacts" standard. 2 Nutri-West contended that
a state can exercise in personam jurisdiction over any non-resident
who is served with process while temporarily within the
defendant
13

forum.

Siding with Nutri-West, the Wyoming Supreme Court unanimously
held that minimum contacts analysis is inappropriate when considering transient jurisdiction.14 Additionally, the court held that the exercise of in personamjurisdiction over Ms. Gibson, based solely on her
transitory presence and personal service within Wyoming, was constitutional. 15

Heated debate surrounds the continued validity of the transient

jurisdiction doctrine. 6 This casenote evaluates the constitutional viability of transient jurisdiction under contemporary notions of due
process.
BACKGROUND

The transient jurisdiction doctrine holds that a state court may exercise in personamjurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who is personally served with process while temporarily present in the forum
state. 17 Typically, no inquiry is made regarding the relationship between
8
the defendant, the forum, and the subject matter of the litigation.

Transient jurisdiction is premised upon the territorial theory ofjudi-

9
cial power propounded in the classic case Pennoyer v. Neff. Under this

12. Brief of Appellant at 4, Nutri-West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693 (Wyo. 1988) (No.
87-266) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant]. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945) states that "minimum contacts" must be established if the defendant
"be not present within the territory of the forum."

13. Brief of Appellant at 7 (citing RESTATEMENT

OF JUDGMENTS §

15 (1942)).

14. Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 695.
15. Id. at 695-96.
16. The United States Supreme Court may decide the constitutionality of transient jurisdiction this term in Burnham v. California Superior Court, No. 89-44, cert.
granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1989).

17.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 28 (Supp. 1989) states the general

rule that "[a] state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who
is present within its territory unless the individual's relationship to the state is so attenuated as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable." Id.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 comment a (1971). But see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 82-84 (1971) for exceptions.
19. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Pennoyer was an ejectment action brought in federal court under the diversity jurisdiction. Pennoyer, the defendant in that action, held the land
under a deed purchased in a sheriffs sale conducted to realize on a judgment for attorney's fees obtained against Neff in a previous action by one
Mitchell. At the time of Mitchell's suit in an Oregon State court, Neff
was a nonresident of Oregon. An Oregon statute allowed service by publication on nonresidents who had property in the State, and Mitchell had
used that procedure to bring Neff before the court. The United States Circuit Court for the District of Oregon, in which Neff brought his ejectment
action, refused to recognize the validity of the judgment against Neff in
Mitchell's suit, and accordingly awarded the land to Neff.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1977).
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theory, the Pennoyer Court espoused three forms of jurisdiction: in personam, in which judgments are personally binding on an individual;
in rem, in which judgments are good against the world as to rights to
a thing; and, quasi in rem, in which judgments declare the rights of
particular individuals in regard to a specific thing.2 According to Pennoyer, a state court could exercise jurisdiction over any individual or
property physically present within the sovereign's territory. 2' A state
court, however, was jurisdictionally powerless outside of its boundaries.2
Thus, provided procedural due process requirements were met, physical presence within a sovereign's territory became both essential and
sufficient to confer state court jurisdiction.2"
As technology advanced and interstate activity became more practical, Pennoyer'sstrict territorial approach to jurisdiction proved unsatisfactory.24 Motorists would enter a state, commit a tort, and be out of
the state before process could be served. Corporations, too, were troublesome. According to prevalent legal thinking, a corporation existed as
a fictional entity only in the state of its incorporation and was amenable to suit only in that state.2" To deal with these problems, courts
devised theories of fictional presence2 6 and implied consent 2 to gain
jurisdiction over persons and corporations not served with process when
physically present within the state's boundaries.
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington greatly liberalized Pennoyer's
strict territorial doctrine.2 8 According to InternationalShoe, the defendant's physical presence within the forum's territory was no longer
essential to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.2 9 Rather, if the
defendant was not present within the state, due process required only
that the state have certain "minimum contacts" with the defendant
20. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724-34.
21. Id. at 722.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1064-1067
(1987) for an excellent discussion on the evolution of the territorial theory of judicial
power.
25. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839). "[A] corporation can have no
legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created." Id. at 588.
26. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
"A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the
absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such manner and
to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there." Id. at 265.
27. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). Hess was the beginning of
numerous state statutes under which nonresidents entering a foreign state to engage
in dangerous activities (operating motor vehicles, aircraft, watercraft, selling securities, or engaging in dangerous construction) were deemed to appoint a state official
as their attorney for purposes of service of process in regard to injuries caused within
the state. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 24, § 1065 at 237, 239.
28. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe Company was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri. Id. at 313. The United States
Supreme Court allowed the State of Washington to assert jurisdiction over International Shoe Company based upon solicitation activities of Shoe salesmen within the
State. Id. at 321.
29. Id. at 316.
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such that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction would not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'
InternationalShoe marked an era of changing judicial philosophy.
Reasonableness and fairness to the defendant rather than territorial
power became a growing concern of the Court.3 1 InternationalShoe's
minimum contacts standard, however, augmented rather than replaced
physical presence as a basis for in personamjurisdiction.2 Courts continued to exercise in personam, in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction
based solely upon territorial presence.
The territorial theory of judicial power sometimes resulted in fortuitous, irrational assertions of jurisdiction. Grace v. MacArthur33 and
Seider v. Roth34 are classic examples. In Grace, an Arkansas court
asserted in personamjurisdiction over an Illinois resident served with
process while flying over Arkansas. 5 And, in Seider,a New York court
asserted quasi in rem jurisdiction over a Canadian by attaching his
insurance policy which had been issued by a company doing business
in New York.36 These assertions of jurisdiction apparently offended the
United States Supreme Court, for the Court in Shaffer v. Heitner
declared that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its
progeny." 3' Although this mandate appears simple, considerable controversy exists over its exact contours2
Shaffer was a shareholder derivative suit brought against the
officers and directors of a Delaware corporation. 9 The Delaware corporation had its principal place of business in Arizona, 40 and the alleged
improprieties constituting the subject matter of the suit occurred in
30. Id. InternationalShoe's explicit language is:

[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territoryof the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."
Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 317. Due process demands are met by "such contacts.., with the state
•.. as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system, to require [a defendant]
...to defend the particular suit ... brought there." Id.
32. Id. at 316.
33. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
34. 17 N.Y.2d. 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
35. Grace, 170 F. Supp. at 443, 447.
36. Seider, 216 N.E.2d at 313-14.
37. 433 U.S. 186, 122 (1977).
38. See generally, Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Courts Latest Words on
State Court Jurisdiction,26 EMORY L.J. 739 (1977); Glen, An Analysis of "Mere Presence"
and Other TraditionalBases of Jurisdiction,45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 607 (1979); Vernon,
State-Court Jurisdiction:A PreliminaryInquiry into the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner,
63 IowA L. REV. 997 (1978).
39. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189.
40. Id.
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Oregon.4 ' In Delaware, the shareholder obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants by attaching their stock which
was statutorily present within the state.4" The defendant stock owners
contested jurisdiction arguing that they had insufficient contacts with
Delaware to support a constitutional assertion of jurisdiction over
them. 43 The trial court rejected these arguments,

44

and the Delaware

Supreme Court affirmed, holding InternationalShoe inapplicable to
quasi in rem jurisdiction.4 5
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Delaware Supreme
Court, holding that in rem jurisdiction based solely upon the presence
of property within the forum state was no longer sufficient to pass constitutional muster.4 6 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, noted that
an assertion of in rem jurisdiction over property was of no less significance than an assertion of in personamr jurisdiction over the property
owner.4 7 Hence, the standards of fairness and reasonableness set out
in InternationalShoe must apply to all assertions of state court jurisdiction.48 Justice Marshall stressed that the relationship among the
defendant, the forum and the litigation was the center of concern when
assessing the constitutionality of an assertion of judicial jurisdiction.49
Presence, he noted, was a factor to be considered, but was no longer
dispositive.5 °
Many legal scholars have interpreted the Shaffer opinion to be the
obituary of transient jurisdiction.5 They argue that since the mere
presence of property is no longer sufficient for in rem jurisdiction, an
individual's mere presence must likewise be insufficient for in personam jurisdiction under InternationalShoe's minimum contacts standard.52 Courts, however, have been loath to interpret Shaffer so broadly.
The majority of lower federal and state courts addressing the issue post41. Id. at 190.
42. Id. at 190-92.
43. Id. at 193.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 194-95.
46. Id. at 215.
47. Id. at 207.
48. Id. at 212.
49. Id. at 204.
50. Id. at 207, 211-12.
51. See, e.g., Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner:A Death Warrantfor the Transient Rule
of In PersonamJurisdiction?,25 ViLL. L. REV. 38 (1979-80) [hereinafter Bernstine]; Casad,
Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in JurisdictionTheory?, 26 U. KAN. L. REV.
61 (1977); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33 (1978).
52. See, e.g., Bernstine, supra note 51, at 66. Bernstine noted:
[I]t would be somewhat odd that a nonresident defendant, whose property
is located in the forum, would not be subject to jurisdiction there because
his property does not give rise to sufficient minimum contacts, while
another nonresident defendant, who owns no property in the forum, does
no business in the state, and does not otherwise avail himself of the state's
benefits and protection, will nevertheless be subject to the court's jurisdiction merely because of his transient presence.
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Shaffer have held that transient jurisdiction remains valid,53 and a
minority have held that it does not.54
PRINCIPAL CASE

Consistent with the majority, the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld
the transient jurisdiction doctrine in Nutri-West v. Gibson.55 The District Court of Converse County, however, applied minimum contacts
analysis and found that Ms. Gibson, her partners, and the partnership
Nutri-West of California had insufficient contacts with Wyoming to
support a constitutional assertion of in personam jurisdiction over
them. 6
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court cited Wyoming Statute
section 5-1-107(a)57 which gives Wyoming courts the authority to exercise jurisdiction to the constitutionally permissible limits. 58 Defining
those limits, the court stated that an assertion of in personamjurisdiction is constitutional if proper service is made and if notions of due
process are not offended.-9
The Nutri-West court concluded that proper service had been made
upon Ms. Gibson and the partnership, but not upon the individual partners." Addressing the due process issue, the court found that: 1) minimum contacts analysis is inappropriate when in personam jurisdiction
is based upon personal service within the forum;61 and 2) in personam
jurisdiction based on presence alone comports with traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice and, hence, does not offend due
62

process.

Minimum Contacts Analysis
The Nutri-West court cited Shaffer's mandate that all assertions
of state court jurisdiction must be analyzed according to standards set
forth by InternationalShoe and its progeny.6 3 The court noted, however,
that InternationalShoe's language explicitly excuses from minimum
contacts analysis assertions of in personamjurisdiction based on phys53. See, e.g., Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1388-89 (5th Cir.1987); Amuse-

ment Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 268-70 (5th Cir. 1985); Opert v. Schmid,
535 F. Supp. 591, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Lockert v. Breedlove, 321 N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d
581, 583 (1987).
54. See, e.g., Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1985);
Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software, 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
55. Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 696.
56. Id. at 694.
57. Wyo. STAT. § 5-1-107(a) (1977) provides: "A Wyoming court may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Wyoming or United States constitution."
58. Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 695.
59. Id. at 694 (citing First Wyoming Bank, N.A., Rawlins v. Trans Mountain Sales
& Leasing, Inc., 602 P.2d 1219 (Wyo. 1979)).
60. Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 696-97.
61. Id. at 695 (citing Amusement Equip., 779 F.2d at 269).
62. Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 695-96.
63. Id. at 695.
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ical presence and personal service within the forum.64 Thus, the court
concluded that an assertion of transient jurisdiction is not subject to
minimum contacts analysis.6 5
Due Process Analysis
The Wyoming Supreme Court also recognized that due process
requires that assertions of jurisdiction not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.6 6 Since in personam jurisdiction
based upon mere presence was a traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice, the court concluded that the exercise of transient jurisdiction was constitutional. 7 To buttress this conclusion, the court stated
that in personamjurisdiction based on mere presence was historically
accepted and easy to apply. 8 Additionally, the Nutri-West court noted
that Ms. Gibson came to Wyoming voluntarily, that she benefited from
being there, and that therefore she was jurisdictionally at risk.69 The
court also stated that the exercise of jurisdiction is an act of sovereign
power which due process concerns limit but do not eradicate. 0
Concluding, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that there was no
unfairness in predicating in personamjurisdiction upon the transient
presence of an individual within the State,71 and added that it would
not reject the transient jurisdiction doctrine without direction from
higher authority.72
ANALYSIS

The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision that in personamjurisdiction may constitutionally be predicated on mere presence and service
of process within the forum is analytically flawed. Admittedly, a cursory treatment of Shaffer and InternationalShoe could lead to the conclusion that minimum contacts analysis is applicable only if the defendant is not present within the forum state.7" The Wyoming Supreme
Court, however, would have concluded that transient jurisdiction is no
longer constitutionally viable absent minimum contacts analysis had
it: first, critically considered Shaffer's impact on the validity of using
mere presence as a constitutional basis for jurisdiction; second, made
an effort to determine the status of defendants' rights under contem64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Amusement Equip., 779 F.2d at 269 (discussing Insurance
Ireland,
67.
68.
69.

Corp. of

Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982))).
Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 695-96.
Id. at 696.
Id.

70. Id. (citing Amusement Equip., 779 F.2d at 270).

71. Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 696.
72. Id. (citing Opert, 535 F. Supp. at 594).
73. See, e.g., Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1987); Amusement
Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985); Opert v. Schmid, 535 F. Supp.
591 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Lockert v. Breedlove, 321 N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d 581 (1987).
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porary notions of due process; and third, recognized that transient jurisdiction serves no important purpose within current jurisdictional
schemes.
Shaffer casts an ominous shadow on the sanctity of using mere
presence as a constitutional basis for jurisdiction.14 Although basing
in rem jurisdiction on mere presence was traditionally considered to
comport with fair play and substantial justice," the United States
Supreme Court flatly rejected the contention that such was still the
case.7" Rather, the Shaffer Court noted that a defendant's due process
rights could be readily offended by the "perpetuation of ancient forms"
of jurisdiction.7 7 Consequently, Justice Marshall went well beyond the
necessary holding in Shaffer to declare that all assertions of state court
jurisdiction must be evaluated by InternationalShoe's fairness standard. 8 Justice Marshall recognized that the relationship between the
defendant, the forum and the litigation, rather than sovereign power,
was the proper focus when assessing the fairness, and therefore the
constitutionality, of any particular assertion of state court jurisdiction. 9
Significantly, the Shaffer opinion also rejected the very arguments
which the Wyoming Supreme Court presented in support of transient
jurisdiction. In rem jurisdiction based upon mere presence was also
historically entrenched, easy to apply and predictable. Yet, as Justice
Marshall noted, defendants' due process rights precluded the continued
recognition of mere presence as a constitutional basis of jurisdiction.80
The Wyoming Supreme Court refused to extend Shaffer's logic and
strike mere presence as a sufficient basis for a constitutional exercise
of in personamjurisdiction."1 Instead, the Wyoming court relied on a
wooden interpretation of InternationalShoe's language and concluded
that minimum contacts analysis is appropriate only if the individual
"be not present within the territory of the forum."82
Despite holding that minimum contacts analysis is inappropriate
when considering transient jurisdiction, the Wyoming Supreme Court
did acknowledge that any assertion of state court jurisdiction must comply with due process.83 The Nutri-West court, however, failed to cor74. See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL, & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 25 (4th
ed. 1986). The authors comment that "[a] new cloud...has been cast over the validity
of transient jurisdiction. The cloud is the pronouncement in Shaffer v. Heitnerthat all
state court exercises of jurisdiction must be compatible with the standards of International Shoe and its progeny." Id.
75. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723.
76. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211-12.
77. Id. at 212.
78. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Marshall prefaced this mandate by stating: "Its
[in rem jurisdiction based on mere presence] continued acceptance would serve only
to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant." Id.
79. Id. at 204.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 212.
Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 696.
Id. at 695.
Id.
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rectly define the scope of defendants' due process protections as currently viewed by the United States Supreme Court.
Beginning with International Shoe, the United States Supreme
Court has consistently held that reasonableness and fairness to the
defendant are the standards against which the constitutionality of an
assertion of jurisdiction must be evaluated.8 4 As noted in International
Shoe, the demands of due process are met if a defendant has such contacts with the forum state as would make it reasonable to require him
to defend suit there.85 The Court, in accord with these propositions, has
expressed the view that due process protects an individual's liberty
interest in not being compelled to defend a suit in a substantially
unrelated forum.8 6
The Wyoming Supreme Court's assertion that in personam jurisdiction based upon mere presence is constitutional largely disregards
these contemporary notions of due process. A little imagination can
surely hypothesize situations in which presence-based jurisdiction would
be unfair and unreasonable. Concrete examples also exist. Grace v.
MacArthur, where an Illinois defendant was served with process while
flying over Arkansas,87 is an example; Amusement Equipment v. Mordelt, where an agent of a West German corporation was served with
process while in Louisiana attending a trade show,8" is another; and
Nutri-West v. Gibson8 9 may also fall into this category.
Because jurisdiction based on mere presence can do violence to defendants' contemporary due process rights, the continued recognition of
the transient jurisdiction doctrine is no longer wise.9 0 Presence-based
jurisdiction is a remnant of an era when interstate and international
travel were impracticable.9 1 Suits were generally between neighbors
and imposed no unreasonable burden on the defendant. 2 Today, by contrast, interstate and international travel are the norm, and a defendant can experience substantial unfairness and burden if he is amenable
to suit through service of process in every state he enters.9
Additionally, adherence to the transient jurisdiction doctrine is no
longer necessary. 4 Long-arm statutes enable a plaintiff to reach beyond
state boundaries and, through extraterritorial service and a showing
84. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. California Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S.
84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
85. InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
86. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702-03.
87. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).

88. 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985).
89. 764 P.2d 693 (Wyo. 1988).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON
Bernstine, supra note 51, at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 61.

THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
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of minimum contacts, compel the appearance of a nonresident defendant to a suit brought in a foreign state.95 The only role transient jurisdiction plays, therefore, is to allow plaintiffs to compel the appearance
of nonresident defendants to suits brought in states where minimum
contacts could not otherwise be established.
Absent minimum contacts analysis, the recurrent danger is that
transient jurisdiction will be exercised in a forum where "no part of
the operative facts occurred and in which neither of the parties live."96
Additionally, the forum may not be "in a favorable position to deal intelligently either with the facts or the law." 97 To avoid these unfortunate
situations and to protect defendants' due process rights, transient jurisdiction should be subject to minimum contacts analysis.9"
Adopting minimum contacts analysis as Shaffer suggests-across
the board-will rarely result in a state having to dismiss a suit for lack
ofjurisdiction. Most often, the defendant served with process in a state
will have other contacts with the forum sufficient to support a constitutional assertion of jurisdiction.99 Minimum contacts analysis will,
however, filter out those defendants whose only contact with the state
is transient presence and protect them from having to defend a suit
under circumstances that are fairly classified as oppressive, fortuitous,
or attenuated.' 0
An Illinois federal district court highlighted the illogical and oppressive nature of allowing transient jurisdiction without minimum contacts.'' If the minimum contacts standard were held inapplicable to
transient jurisdiction, the court stated, an individual would be afforded
less protection than would his property when found within a foreign
state. 2 "Surely0 3the Shaffer Court did not intend such an illogical and
unfair result.'
CONCLUSION

Defendants have a liberty interest in not being compelled to defend
a suit in an substantially unrelated forum. This liberty interest is protected by requiring that state court assertions of jurisdiction be fair
and reasonable. Minimum contacts analysis is the means by which the
95. See generally 4 C.

96. W. CooK,

WRIGHT

& A.

MILLER,

supra note 24, § 1068.

THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 100

(1949).

97. A. Ehrenzweig, The TransientRule of PersonalJurisdiction:The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289-90 (citing Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal
Actions, 23 ILL. L. REV. 427, 438 (1929)).
98. World-Wide Volkswagon states that one of the essential functions on minimum contacts analysis is to protect defendants against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 29192.
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fairness and reasonableness of any particular assertion of state court
jurisdiction should be evaluated.
The Wyoming Supreme Court, by holding minimum contacts analysis inapplicable to transient jurisdiction, perpetuates an anomaly that
seriously undermines defendants' contemporary due process rights.
Transient jurisdiction should be subject to minimum contacts analysis as a necessary check against oppressive, fortuitous and attenuated
assertions of state court jurisdiction.
The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, by expressing no intention to retire the transient jurisdiction doctrine without a direct mandate, sends a clear message that would-be defendants need beware of
feeling too at home on the range.
DALE FLOYD CALL
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